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Greater China and the Political Economy of Regionalisation∗
 
 
It is not that long ago when the study of China’s political economy could all but 
ignore the external dynamic of the global political economy. But with China’s 
insertion into that global political economy – particularly after Deng Xiaoping’s 
nanxun 南巡 in 1992 – not only has China become embedded in the global, but the 
global is also increasingly embedding itself in China. 
 
One of the most striking features of this change is the extent to which foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into China, particularly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, has driven an 
export boom – an export boom which itself has been the major engine of domestic 
economic growth in China. In this respect, the term “Greater China” is a useful 
addition to the lexicon of discourses on understanding economic change in 
contemporary China. It draws attention to the increasingly transnational nature of 
economic activity and the disjuncture between national boundaries as the limits of 
political space1.  
 
However, we need to take care about the way we construct a notion of a Greater 
China economic space to ensure that we do not obscure as much as we elucidate about 
the dynamics of transnational economic processes. “Greater China” can be both too 
big and too small. In many cases the term “Greater China” is simply used as a 
shorthand way of aggregating the economies of mainland China, the two Special 
Autonomous Regions of Macao and Hong Kong, and Taiwan2. But while some areas 
of the PRC are clearly becoming more closely integrated into the regional and global 
economy, other areas (and economic sectors) are not. Other understandings of a 
Greater China economic space are too small, in that they try to construct a very 
narrow conception of regional integration that pays insufficient attention to the role of 
extra-regional actors and interests, wider processes of East Asian regionalisation, and 
the significance of globalising processes.  
 
In considering the possible emergence of a Greater China economic space, we need to 
consider three key characteristics of regionalisation. First, if we retain a geographic 
focus for regionalisation, then we should not simply think in terms of integration 
between entire national territories. Across the globe, it is often two or more sub-
national entities that are becoming integrated – it is not regionalisation but 
“microregionalisation”3. Under this understanding, international economic integration 
and the creation of a transnational regional space can contribute to national economic 
fragmentation and disjunctures in the national economic space. Second, there are 
multiple forms of transnational economic spaces that often overlap with each other. 
Greater China economic regionalisation occurs, and is largely driven by, wider 
processes of East Asian regionalisation, which themselves interacts with, and are 
largely driven by, wider global processes. 
 
Third, there is the problem of cartography. By this I refer to understandings of 
economic space which, whilst trying to move away from the nation state and political 
boundaries as the basis of analysis, are still based on constructing geographically 
bound conceptions. The boundaries to economic spaces may no longer be individual 
national political boundaries, but are instead the cumulative national boundaries of the 
regional states and territories. Rather than conceive as economic space as nationally 
bound, we can instead conceive of economic spaces that are embedded in 
“commodity driven production networks”4 that are trans or supranational in nature.  
 
Transnational Economic Spaces: Regionalisation and Regionalism 
The study of regional integration is often predicated on key assumptions about both 
the processes and outcomes of integrative projects that are not always efficacious for 
studying East Asia. For example, Balassa’s influential work on economic integration 
established a model which started from formal co-operation between states followed 
by the progressive movement towards a free trade area, a customs union, a common 
market, monetary union and finally total economic integration5. It was a predictive 
model that expects certain formal intergovernmental action before we can say that 
“economic integration” has occurred. 
 
In addition, the study of regionalism as a sub-set of political economy has been 
heavily influenced by the European experience – and in many respects too heavily 
influenced. The construction of a European mode of regional governance after World 
War Two has become not so much an example of regional construction, but all but the 
archetypal model against which other regional projects are judged. A number of 
scholars explicitly took the European experience as a predictor for the future of 
regionalism elsewhere6. Despite the decline in predictive models of regionalism based 
on the European experience in the mid-1970s7, there remains in much scholarship an 
understanding that regionalism will entail at least some of the institutionalisation 
exhibited in the European model, and there is often an implicit understanding that 
something like the European Union will be the end point of integrative processes8.  
 
This emphasis on intergovernmentalism as the main dynamic behind interpretations of 
processes of regional integration frustrated those who argued that real economic 
integration was occurring across national political boundaries where there was no 
formal intergovernmental agreement or institutionalisation - processes that were not 
captured by statist top down definitions of regionalism. As such, a common theme in 
the expanding literature on “new regionalism” is the need to distinguish between the 
different types of regional processes. Thus, “regionalism” has widely become 
accepted to refer to the conscious and deliberate attempts by national states to create 
formal mechanisms for dealing with common transnational issues through 
intergovernmental dialogue and treaty. By contrast, “regionalisation” thus conceived 
as an undirected process of growing interdependence which originates in the actions 
of individuals, groups and corporations rather than through the deliberate actions of 
national governments 9 . While accepting that governments and intergovernmental 
dialogue remain important, the emphasis here is on other actors and other forms of 
interaction across national political borders that tie people and economies together. 
 
These two types of processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, some 
theorists see regionalism as a response to regionalisation. Neofunctionalists and 
neoliberal institutionalists share a conviction that as economic activity becomes more 
international, states co-operate to find regional solutions to common problems. While 
this may originally take the form of informal or ad hoc co-operation, they typically 
become formalised in regional organisations. Neofunctionalists argue that while such 
co-operation usually originates in the economic sphere, it will eventually “spillover” 
into other forms of joint political co-operation, and eventually to political integration 
and the transcendence of the state. Thus, political integration can be seen as the 
unintentional consequence of a number of smaller economic decisions by non-state 
actors10.  
 
But while an emphasis on regionalisation might, from some perspectives, be the 
precursor to the establishment of formal regionalism, there is no assumption in the 
literature of “new regionalisms” of convergence towards a final form of regional 
governance. Rather there is an acceptance of diversity. As Smart argues:  
“capitalist practices are embedded in local structures, and that certain contexts 
can generate new and vibrant variations upon the theme of capitalism. If 
nothing else, globalization produces a considerably diverse set of local 
outcomes”11
Thus, we should expect increased economic interaction to produce a variety of 
different processes of regional economic integration – not all of which will lead to 
formal regionalism.  
 
Indeed, for those who point to the importance of the deterritorialisation of production, 
there is little or no evidence to suggest that regionalisation will lead to regionalism. 
For many, the key to understanding globalisation is a knowledge of “post-Taylorist 
‘flexible’”12 approaches to the organization of production within and between firms.  
‘capitalism today…entails the detailed disaggregation of stages of production 
and consumption across national boundaries, under the organizational 
structure of densely networked firms or enterprises’ .13  
While the international economy of the Bretton Woods era characterised by exchange 
relations between national economies, the new political economy is grounded in: 
‘the structural power of internationally mobile capital. States now have to 
recognise the power not only of other states and international organisations …. 
but also of international capital, the banks, and foreign exchange markets.’14  
 
We need to take care not to just explain regionalisation as simply an economic 
process. For example, in the extreme “hyper-globalisation” thesis of Kenichi Ohmae, 
the role and significance of the state and state actors in the creation of what he terms 
“region states” is essentially ignored. The significance of state borders is also, at the 
very least, downgraded: 
 “What defines [region states] is not the location of their political borders but 
the fact that they are the right size and scale to be the true, natural business 
units in today's global economy.” 15
It is true that that the investment decisions of corporations and the mobility of capital 
has been the major dynamic for regionalisation. Rising manufacturing costs in the 
region led producers to shift capital out of the original regional developmental states 
into a new cheaper production site – China. But while non-sate actors play a dominant 
role in shaping financial and commodity flows, so to do states and state actors who 
facilitate the spread of global finance and production. 
 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) do not create themselves; taxes are not lowered (or 
removed) on their own; and money can only be freely exchanged across national 
political borders if governments allow it (well, legally at least). Neither do ports, 
roads and railways build themselves – as the German Budestag report on globalization 
forcefully argued, the hard infrastructure that is so necessary for the physical 
transportation of goods is usually funded by governments rather than by the private 
sector and: 
 ‘The growing worldwide integration of economies came not by any law of 
nature – it has been the result of active and deliberate policies’.16
 
Policies designed to facilitate interaction with the global economy are predicated on a 
prior ideational choice that participation in the global economy is beneficial to 
perceived interests. In the Chinese case, the interests of key party-state elites lay in 
generating growth to provide an economic basis for legitimising continued communist 
party rule. As with many other developing countries, the best way of ensuring this 
growth was increasingly seen as achieving rapid capital accumulation through 
insertion into the capitalist global economy. There is thus and ideational acceptance, 
albeit not necessarily explicitly stated, that dependence on the capitalist global 
economy is the best or at least the quickest way of promoting economic growth. So 
while the actions of external non-state actors have played a significant role in the 
reconfiguration of economic space, we should be careful not to relegate the state to a 
passive or even irrelevant role. The state acts as a facilitator of non-state economic 
flows, establishing the environment in which the market can function.  
 
Great China and Regionalisation 
Intra-regional FDI 
The prima facie evidence for the existence of a Greater China economic space is built 
on the extent of non-PRC Chinese investment in the PRC, and the importance of PRC 
trade with other Chinese states/territories. Perhaps the most compelling case for the 
existence of a Greater China economic space arises from an analysis of the growth 
and extent of investment from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan into China. Houde and 
Lee calculate that between 1993 and 1998, Hong Kong provided over half of all 
investment into China, Taiwan nearly eight per cent, and Singapore around 4.5 per 
cent 17 . Deploying an ethnicity rather than nation centred approach, Charles Wolf 
calculates that “two-thirds [of all investment has] come from “overseas” Chinese, 
especially overseas Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia.”18. If we add 
in investment from Japan, then the figure for Asia as a whole rises to nearly 80 per 
cent, with Europe and North America each accounting for between seven and nine per 
cent depending on which figures are used.  
 
When assessing all things related to the Chinese economy, we need to insert a caveat 
over the reliability of Chinese statistics. Of particular relevance here is the practice of 
routing domestic PRC investment through Hong Kong in order to take advantage of 
incentives for foreign investors. This practice allows PRC investors to gain tax 
exemptions on initial profits, and on imported machinery and components. It also 
provides a means of bypassing restrictions on currency conversion and capital flight 
through the practice of overcharging for imported materials. It is difficult to estimate 
the full extent of this practice – its illegality is not exactly conducive to transparency, 
though a figure of around 14 per cent of all investment from Hong Kong is not 
generally challenged19. 
 
More recent figures on investment suggest a relative decline in the importance of 
investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan. This is partly due to the rise of investment 
from the USA in the wake of China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. It is also partly a 
result of a rush by South Korean companies to move large parts of their 
manufacturing capacity to China in 2003. More important is the astonishing rise of 
investment from Latin America. Almost all of this Latin American investment comes 
from the British Virgin Islands, (now the second largest investor in China) and the 
Cayman Islands (now eighth). The explanation for this rise in investment is found in 
the fiscal regimes of the Virgin and Cayman Islands. Investors from other countries – 
notably Hong Kong and Taiwan – incorporate in these tax havens in order to lower 
(or eliminate) their fiscal commitments20. 
 
The very nature of this type of investment makes it difficult to know where it 
originates. Wu et al point to the significance of Hong Kong companies, noting a 
fivefold increase in the number of Hong Kong companies incorporating in Bermuda 
in a decade21. Other data, supported by interviews in the region, emphasises the role 
of Taiwanese firms - partly to take advantage of the tax regime, but also to bypass 
Taiwanese government restrictions on investment in the mainland. After China, the 
British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands rank second and third respectively as the 
biggest recipients of Taiwanese outward investment 22 . As such, although official 
figures show a decline in the importance of Chinese investment into China since 
1998, this appears to have more to do with methods of identifying the nationality of 
investment, rather than a real decline in investment led regionalisation. 
 
Intra-regional trade 
An assessment of trade patterns might lead to similar conclusions about greater China 
economic integration. Though here too we face problems in interpreting statistics due 
to the special role of Hong Kong in Chinese trade. Prior to the start of the reform 
process in 1978, Hong Kong provided China's main link with the global economy, 
acting as a transit point for exports and imports with the capitalist world. As China 
has established more and more bilateral economic relations with other countries, we 
might expect the importance of Hong Kong to decline. But China's special 
relationship with Hong Kong has remained intact.  
 
Trade between China and Hong Kong is now the world's third biggest bilateral trade 
relationship (behind US-Canada and US-Japan trade)23. Furthermore, the percentage 
of Chinese exports to Hong Kong which are subsequently re-exported to other 
destinations has actually increased, and Hanson and Feenstra calculate that between 
1988 and 1998, just over half of all Chinese exports were routed through Hong 
Kong24. So while an initially glance at direction of trade statistics suggests that Hong 
Kong is a major consumer of Chinese exports, the reality is that the overwhelming 
majority of these exports subsequently end up elsewhere – predominantly in the US, 
the EU, and Japan.  
 
The real significance of trade for regional integration is in China’s position as a 
recipient of imports from Taiwan and Hong Kong. This is in no small part due to the 
migration of Hong Kong’s manufacturing industries over the border into China. 
Facing rising land and labour costs, Hong Kong producers have simply moved 
production over the border into China is a similar way to which maquiladora factories 
developed in Mexico through the migration of US companies. In both examples, the 
core urban sector has essentially extended its economic influence over the national 
political border - hence the process is sometimes simply referred to as “metropolitan 
spillover” or as “extended metropolis”25 . In effect, components are exported into 
China from Hong Kong, and the finished produce then re-exported out through Hong 
Kong to markets in the developed world - as Berger and Lester argue, the goods are 
made in China, but made by Hong Kong26.  
 
As Taiwanese firms subsequently moved much of their productive capacity to China, 
this similarly generated a wave of exports to China in the form of components used to 
manufacture finished goods to markets in third countries. What this suggests, then, is 
the emergence of a region of production built on a dense network of investment 
generated trade relationships. But crucially, it is a process of integration that has far 
from impacted on all of China, and one that is predicated on wider global processes, 
and extra-regional actors and interests.  
 
Great China and Microregional Integration 
The majority of work on regionalisms new and old concentrates on relationships 
between two or more nation states. However, largely inspired by the work of political 
and economic geographers27, there is a strand of literature in international political 
economy that points to the importance of moving away from national conceptions. 
Rather, it argues that much of the real integration that is taking place – primarily 
economic integration – takes place below the national level28.  
 
Such sub-national cross-national regional integration can take the form of formal 
regional agreements - for example, the growth triangles that have been a formal part 
of region building within ASEAN since 199229. At the risk of oversimplification, we 
can identify three main reasons for the establishment of these regions. The first is the 
desire to exploit economic complementarity. An example here would be the 
development of the Tumen River Delta project. National and local state leaders30 are 
attempting to build a region that can exploit the capital and technology of Japan and 
South Korea; the natural resources of the Russian far east (and potentially North 
Korea); and the abundant (and cheap) labour, land and primary resources in north-
eastern China. 
 
The second is where sub-regional growth areas are proposed and created to facilitate 
resource pooling, and/or the joint development of natural resources, infrastructure, 
and industries in cases where the resources are located on or around the international 
border.  A good example is the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area to explore 
and transport offshore natural gas to Songkhla in southern Thailand for onward 
redistribution to each country’s market. In such cases, the initiatives stem from 
sharing capital investment, and potentially also from resolving territorial disputes 
(particularly in the case of off-shore resources). 
 
The third is where neighbouring local authorities deem that local collective action is 
the most efficient mechanism of dealing with local transboundary issues. Morata’s 
analysis of North-West Mediterranean Euroregion provides a good example here31. 
Established by the Presidents of Catalonia, Lanquedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrenees, 
Morata argues that sub-regionalism was driven by the development of wider 
European integration. In essence, the authority and efficacy of national governments 
in dealing with transboundary issues has been undermined by both the transfer of 
some fields of national sovereignty upwards to the EU and the concomitant 
dismantling of national borders as barriers to inter-EU trade. Institutional changes at 
the EU level, as well as new communication technologies and the development of 
transportation, have encouraged the formation of regional networks based on common 
interests in terms of economic development. Microregionalism, then, not only 
coexists with other forms of regionalism and globalization, it is inextricably linked to 
them. 
 
The link between the microregion and globalization is perhaps even clearer when it 
comes to microregionalisation. Here, there is no formal agreement and no formal 
conception of the borders and parameters of microregional integration. But the level 
of economic interaction is so great that a new economic space is created that spans 
national political borders. And of course, given the political difficulties that make 
intergovernmental dialogue between China and Taiwan so problematic, it is 
microregionalisation that is most germane to this study.  
 
For China watchers, the need to disaggregate the Chinese economy to take into 
account regional variations is now almost taken for granted. There is now a relatively 
large literature on the relationship between central and local authorities in China. 
Chung’s “mid term appraisal” of centre local relations in 1995 showed work on 
centre-local relations already constituted a sizeable and growing sub-field within 
Chinese studies32 . Not surprisingly, this canon of work has undergone substantial 
growth in the subsequent years, including the establishment of the journal “Provincial 
China” in recognition of the diverse nature of politics and society beneath the national 
level. Although Lynne T White (1998, 1999) rebuked the mainstream “centralist” 
literature on China in his study of Shanghai33, the idea that the study of China’s 
political economy must look at what happens at the sub-state level is now all but 
firmly accepted by scholars of contemporary China.  
 
A key consideration in this literature is the differential wealth of China’s provinces. 
And here, the ability to attract foreign investment – to engage with the global 
economy – is particularly important. Almost 90 per cent of cumulative FDI since 
1978 has gone to coastal provinces from Zhuhai in the south to the Liaodong 
peninsular in the north. Indeed, statistics from MOFTEC show that FDI in 
Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shanghai alone accounted for roughly half the national total 
in 2000. Guangdong Province has been the single biggest recipient, though its share 
of investment has declined as more FDI has moved to other coastal areas such as 
Shanghai and Liaoning 34 . Nevertheless, Guangdong, or more correctly, the Pearl 
River Delta, remains a major site for FDI. Only four provinces (Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Fujian, and Shandong – plus of course, Guangdong itself) received more FDI than 
Shenzhen alone. This uneven share of provincial FDI is also reflected in the uneven 
distribution of exports from Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs), with eight coastal 
provinces accounting for 95 per cent of all FIE exports. When you add on trade by 
companies working on contracts for foreign companies, then getting on for 75 per 
cent of all trade in these coastal provinces is carried out either by or for external 
companies. 
 
 
Typically, the value added within China is relatively low in these export oriented 
FIEs. In an early work on FDI in China, Lardy calculated that imported components 
typically accounted for 90 per cent of the value of exports from FIEs35. In 2000, the 
value of imports of foreign invested enterprises was 98 per cent of the value of 
exports - indeed, 1998 was the first year that the value of exports from FIEs actually 
surpassed the value of their imports - though this is a very rough indicator as it 
includes all imports, not just those used to produce exports. If we just look at the 
processing trade alone, then the figures show that imports accounted for 86.5 per cent 
of the value of FIE processing trade exports in 200036. 
 
What this means is that there are very low levels of integration between these FIEs 
and the domestic Chinese economy. They utilise domestic energy, land and labour, 
but very little else. Just as Bernard and Ravenhill suggested that export processing 
zones in Malaysia were “more integrated with Singapore’s free-trade industrial sector 
than with the ‘local’ industry”37, so China’s FIEs are physically located in China, but 
economically perhaps form part of an economic space that is not territorially bound. 
 
So the concept of Great China as micregion does have validity as an explanatory took 
for understanding the relationship between international economic integration and 
national economic fragmentation. But even here there is a problem as there are low 
levels of integration between different internationally integrated parts of China – they 
are perhaps more integrated with the external than they are with themselves.  
 
So in many respects, it makes less sense to talk about a geographically defined 
microregion of Greater China than concentrating on the individual manifestations of 
microregions – most obviously between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta38. If 
there is a single economic space in which Taiwan, Hong Kong and southern China are 
becoming economically integrated, it is a “hub and spoke” economic space centred on 
Hong Kong, with very weak levels of horizontal integration on the PRC side. Rather 
than talk in terms of one single economic space, or one single process of regional 
integration, perhaps it is wiser to refer to or multiple processes and overlapping mcro-
regionalisation processes. 
 
Or perhaps we should put cartography aside, and think of integration in different 
terms. While local authorities across China may compete with each other to attract 
investment, policy is based in a shared conception of the benefits of engaging with the 
global economy. Specific policies may be confrontational, but there is an increasing 
ideational conformity. Or perhaps we should throw away conceptions of the nation 
state, and instead think of economic spaces that are located within production 
networks. If we do, then we can see that the processes of regional economic 
integration that is taking place within Greater China is in large part dependent on 
wider global process of economic change.  
 
Greater China, East Asia and Globalisation 
We noted above that much of what is produced through investment in China is 
exported to the major markets of the industrialised world – primarily North America, 
Japan and the European Union. Already we see here a key link between regional and 
global processes – if Greater China is a region of production, then this production 
remains largely contingent on consumer demand outside the region. But there is 
another dynamic here as much of the investment itself has its roots outside the region. 
 
As Bernard and Ravenhill 39 , Crone 40 , and perhaps most forcefully, Hatch and 
Yamamura41, have argued, many Taiwanese and Hong Kong Asian producers are tied 
into a position of “technological dependence” on Japan. As such, the suggestion is 
that investments into the PRC by Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors have more to 
do with Japan’s “network power”42 than appears at first sight. The investment into 
and trade with China might not be through Greater China, but it is Japanese 
companies that “cause” this investment and trade 43 . Furthermore, many Japanese 
companies still run their investment projects in China via regional offices based in 
Hong Kong. The use of subsidiaries in Hong Kong is a particularly important element 
in Japanese investment in southern China. Although sorting through the statistics is an 
inexact science, Matsuzaki has estimated that about 80 per cent of Japanese FDI in 
Hong Kong is subsequently reinvested in Guangdong44. The original investment into 
Hong Kong will appear as originating in Japan, but when it is subsequently reinvested 
into China, it will appear as Hong Kong investment, thus providing more statistics to 
support the case for economic integration and even microregional integration in 
Greater China. 
 
When we add this to direct Sino-Japanese trade and direct Japanese FDI into China, 
then the case for a Greater-China economic space, rather than a wider Japan-centred 
regionalisation process, appears to diminish in force. At the very least, Greater 
Chinese regional integration should be viewed in the light of wider regional 
processes. 
 
But it is not just Japan that provides a disguised extra-regional source of investment. 
By considering Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM), investment into China by 
extra-regional actors located within the region, and the growth of Contract 
Manufacturing Enterprises (CMEs), we can see that a tight insular conception of 
Greater China misses the huge significance that extra-regional actors play in fostering 
regional integration. 
 OEM production occurs where a company allows its products to be used in the 
production of other companies’ goods. This might entail the final producer utilising 
technology or components under the original providers name – for example, the use of 
Windows and Intel in many personal computers – or putting their own name on 
components under licensing agreements with the original provider. OEM production 
is particularly important in the computer industry. Around 70 per cent of all computer 
related goods produced by Taiwanese firms are based on OEM contracts with foreign 
firms – primarily from the US and Japan45 . This is partly a result of changes in 
industrial strategy in the US electronics industry. While US IT producer tried to 
compete with Asian companies in the 1980s, they instead moved to create network 
relationships with those producers in the 1990s. The US companies concentrated on 
producing software and hi-tech essential components, leaving the production of the 
computers themselves to Asian partners46. 
  
Taiwanese computer companies in particularly actively embraced this changing 
production structure locating themselves as key links in the production chain. OEM 
agreements with US and Japanese companies allow them to utilise foreign technology 
and operating platforms in their computers – computers that are increasingly 
assembled in low cost factories in China to maintain cost efficiency. Indeed, nearly 
three quarters of China’s computer related products are produced by Taiwanese 
companies, which are themselves dependent on OEM contracts with Japanese and US 
companies 47 . It is particularly important in for three localities in China, where 
Taiwanese computer companies have agglomerated - Dongguan in Guangdong 
Province, Suzhou in Jiangsu and Shanghai. As such, these Taiwanese invested 
factories in China represent the end stage of a production process that spans the most 
industrialized global economies such as the USA and Japan, intermediate states such 
as Taiwan, and developing states like China. And of course, most of the finished 
goods are then sold outside the Greater China region as well. 
 
A second form of extra-regional involvement in Greater China integration is foreign 
indirect investment takes place through subsidiary offices within East Asia, and in 
particular in Hong Kong. As of 1 June 2002, Hong Kong was the host to 3,119 
overseas companies’ regional offices or headquarters, and a further 1,230 local 
offices. Although Japanese companies are the largest representatives (471), US 
companies come a close second (437) 48. Of course, not all of these companies are in 
Hong Kong just to access China, and not all of them will be sources of “Hong Kong” 
investment. Indeed, it is all but impossible to calculate the extent to which investment 
in China from Hong Kong originates from these regional offices of foreign 
companies. Perhaps the best we can say is that Hong Kong remains an important 
platform for third party investment into China which is not revealed by looking at the 
official investment statistics. 
 
It becomes even more difficult to calculate the real extent of non-Chinese investment 
in China when we consider the extent of sub-contracted FDI. Here, third country 
investors do not directly invest in China either directly or through regional offices, but 
instead sub-contract production to investment companies within the Greater China 
region itself. Such investment has been a major element in western companies 
involvement in China in textiles, clothing and shoes, toys, and more recently, 
electronics. There have been a number of studies that trace such indirect investment in 
specific case studies. Perhaps the most famous in the Pou Chen company in Taiwan, 
which produces one in eight of all the world’s sports shoes in factories in China on 
behalf of Nike, Reebok, New Balance, Adidas, Timberland, Asics, Puma, Hi-Tec, 
Lotto, LA Gear, Mitre and so on 49 . A similar example of how Mattell produced 
Barbie dolls in China via a Taiwanese intermediary, first aired in the Los Angeles 
Times50, subsequently had the honour of being used in the State Council White Paper 
on the Sino-US trade imbalance51.  
 
In all the above cases, third party companies have sub-contracted to regional 
intermediaries that have then invested in China – often in joint ventures, though 
wholly foreign owned enterprises are now the investment project of choice. In these 
cases, investment figures for China will show a transfer from the intermediary 
company’s country, and not from the original investor country. A second type of sub-
contracting is where the third country company sub-contracts to a regional 
intermediary, which then produces in China on a contract basis. In these cases, no 
investment will be recorded as the transactions are on a processing fee basis, even 
further disguising the original investors’ involvement in the Chinese economy.  
 
Major investment companies such as the Swire Group and the Jardine Matheson 
Group have long acted as intermediaries between China and the global economy. 
There are also a plethora of locally owned contract manufacturers in Greater China, 
such as Li and Fung in Hong Kong and Hon Hai Precision in Taiwan52. There are 
three main reasons why these intermediary companies have established themselves as 
a link between foreign producers and China. First, Rodrik has noted a tendency to 
sub-contract to countries with poor labour standards rather than invest there directly53. 
This assertion is supported by interviews in Hong Kong. Certain US based companies, 
use sub-contracting through Hong Kong because they fear that being associated with 
sweat-shop production would severely damage their image (and therefore sales) at 
home. They can genuinely argue that they don’t invest in sweat-shops – but it does 
not necessarily mean that products carrying their brand names are not produced in 
sweat shops. 
 
Second, the intermediary companies market themselves as matchmakers with 
specialist knowledge of China. They have the linguistic skills, they know the culture, 
and they have the personal contacts that are so important for doing business in 
China54. In many respects, they exploit the idea that doing business in China is best 
left to the Chinese themselves, and that only those within Greater China can really 
understand Greater China.  
 
This type of production process is referred to as “demand-responsive reflexive”55. In 
real words, this means that major corporations do not have to worry about maintaining 
factories staffed by workers who will not only require higher wages than need to be 
paid in China, but also welfare contributions and redundancy payments if production 
is cut back during times of slack demand.  Indeed, an increasing number of major 
multinational companies simply do not produce anything themselves anymore 
focussing on establishing brand names through PR and marketing56. Even research 
and development is now frequently devolved to contract manufacturers like 
Flextronics, which operates out of Singapore and invests in China for a host of major 
global IT producers. And while such outsourcing through contract manufacturing has 
long been a feature of the textile and apparel industries, it is growing ever more 
significant in the IT industry, growing at 20 to 25 per cent per annum57. 
 
As China has become the “world’s outsourcer of first resort” 58 , it has become 
engaged in this global division of production – typically at the low tech and low value 
added processing stage. In all these cases, the ‘Made in China’ brand will appear on 
the good – a good which carries a non-Chinese brand name. Investment and trade 
figures will show integration in Greater China through increased trade and investment 
flows. But the originators of this investment and the consumers of the finished good 
often lie outside the region. Our understanding of the implications of international 
economic flows are still often based on studying bilateral figures. But as economic 
activity is not restrained by bilateral relationships between nation states, such a focus 
will only at best give us a partial idea of where the real dynamics lie in the global 
political economy.  
 
Whose Region? 
There is a general tendency to assume that regional integration is a positive thing. 
Welfare gains are typically forecast through the reduction of transaction costs, the 
exploitation of economic complementarity and the creation of integrated markets. 
While this assumption is more applicable to formal regionalism rather than 
regionalisation, there is still a largely positive economic conception of integration – 
not least through the transfer of technology and expertise from cores to peripheries. 
Socially, integration is predicted to break down barriers between peoples through 
greater people-to-people transactions. And politically, by coming together to deal with 
common issues, governments are predicted to establish mutual understanding and 
trust with each other.  
 
Assessing the social and political spillovers of Greater China economic integration 
provides a rather mixed picture. In terms of China-Taiwan relations, a strong 
argument can be made for suggesting that economic integration has established the 
basis for a more peaceful relationship. Given that the economic fortunes of the PRC 
are heavily influenced by the investment decisions of Taiwanese businessmen, 
instability in the region (not to mention war) would have a disastrous impact on the 
domestic Chinese economy.  
 
The flip side of this coin is that there is concern within Taiwan that the extent of 
investment on the mainland makes the Taiwan’s economic fortuned dependent on 
what happens in the mainland. Despite introducing policies aimed at slowing rates of 
investment to China, and attempting to divert investment to South East Asia, 
successive Taiwanese governments have been unable to control the investment 
decisions of domestic companies. The view from that side of the Straits is that it is 
Taiwan that is dependent on China, not the other way round, generating fears that the 
mainland will be able hold Taiwan’s economy to ransom if Taiwan pushes for 
independence and/or international recognition as a state. 
 
The economic picture is also not wholly clear cut. With the exception of 2001, 
Taiwan’s GDP has continued to grow as investment and manufacturing have moved 
to China since the first year of large scale investment in 1993. But at the same time, 
the unemployment rate has continued to rise from 1.45% in 1993 to 5.17 % in 2002 
before dropping back to just under five per cent in 2003. Similarly, with the exception 
of 1998, Hong Kong’s GDP has also continued to grow. A growth rate of over 3 per 
cent in 2003 might be modest by historical comparison, but is still a growth rate that 
managers of most economies in the developed world would be more than pleased 
with. But as with Taiwan, unemployment rates have also risen, from two per cent in 
1993 to almost eight per cent in 2003. 
 
Although growing unemployment rates cannot all be blamed on the transfer of 
manufacturing jobs to China – the growing number of women in the workforce in 
Hong Kong being an important case in point. But economic integration built on 
investment and trade to produce exports to third markets does in part explain why 
Taiwan and Hong Kong have witnessed overall growth combined with growing 
unemployment and low or even negative growth in domestic demand. The 
outsourcing of production to produce exports needs neither domestic workers, not the 
domestic market in order to generate corporate profits and overall national growth.  
 
So economic growth that has been achieved in Hong Kong and Taiwan through 
integration with the Chinese economy has been largely jobless growth. Whether 
regionalisation is a good thing or not depends. For business interests provided with an 
opportunity to reduce manufacturing costs and increase profits, it is a very good thing 
indeed. For workers, particularly low skilled labourers, it is a very different matter.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has assessed the notion of a Greater China economic space in light of three 
approaches to understanding international political economy. The first is sub-regional 
integration. This approach maintains a strong notion of geography and territory, and is 
most useful in leading towards an understanding of the processes involved in regional 
integration. In particular, it suggests that sub-regional integration is built on unequal 
levels of development. It also draws attention to the relationship between 
governmental decisions, and the investment decisions of non-state actors (between top 
down and bottom up regional processes).  
 
Furthermore, it is an approach which stresses the importance of limiting the 
geographic scope of our investigation regional integration (on the PRC side at least). 
We need to focus on which parts of China are becoming integrated into a Greater 
China economic space, and perhaps subsequently the implications for governance in 
China of an emergent dualistic economy. 
 
While it is correct to look for perspectives that move away from traditional state 
centred notions of economic “space” or “territory”, in doing so we should not simply 
create new notions of space that are equally constrained by ideas of boundaries – even 
if these are not state boundaries. When we question the porous nature of state borders 
and boundaries, we should be careful in finding new ways of re-drawing borders and 
boundaries. Even one of the architects of the “hyper-globalisation” thesis, Kenichi 
Ohmae falls into this trap. Ohmae argues that maps obstruct our understanding of how 
the global economy works by placing political boundaries in the way of perceptions 
of economic activity59. Yet he too relies on cartography as the boundaries of his 
“region states” are drawn around geographically proximate territories – they are still 
geographically conceived. 
 
Thus, following Bernard60  and others, we can follow a network-centred approach 
which, drawing us even further away from the map than Ohmae, conceptualises a 
more complex structure built on buyer commodity driven chains of decentralised 
production networks61 . At the very least, it forces us to think of the relationship 
between regional integration and globalisation, with the suggestion here that the latter 
has in many ways configured the former. 
 
What might be called a “Coxian” approach62 also draws us away from notions of 
territory and instead emphasises the importance of collaboration between trans-
national economic elites. As with the network approach, it stresses the importance of 
extra-regional economic elites, and suggests an uneven societal (rather than 
geographic) notion of integration – integration is for the elites not the masses (and 
often at the expense of the masses). 
 
It is not my intention to deny the existence of regional integration. Rather, I suggest 
that in assessing the notion of a Greater China economic space, we need to consider 
two key issues. First, regional and global processes should be considered in tandem. 
Indeed, the epistemologies deployed in this paper suggest that globalising forces have 
been key determinants of Greater China sub-regional integration. They also suggest 
that the major drivers of the global economy in the developed world – or perhaps 
more correctly, investors and consumers in the developed world – are key 
determinants of greater Chinese sub-regional integration. Second, we need to think 
about what regional integration really means – who is being integrated with who, for 
whose benefit, and with what implications for policy making and the establishment of 
effective economic governance in individual regional states? 
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